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THIGPEN V. BIBB COUNTY, GEORGIA
223 F.3D 1231 (11TH CIR. 2000)
FACTS
In 1978, James Reeves, a black deputy sheriff, brought a class action racial
discrimination suit against the Bibb County, Georgia, Sheriffs Department
(the "Department") and the Sheriff, "on behalf of all past, present, and future
black applicants for employment with or promotions within the Department."'
The parties settled the dispute and entered into a consent decree ("Reeves
Decree").2 The Reeves Decree provided, in part, that "each year at least fifty
percent (50%) of the promotions will be blacks who have met the requirements
for promotion to their next highest position."3 The Department has complied
with the Reeves Decree since its ratification.4
Plaintiffs William Thigpen, Jr. and James Allen ("plaintiffs") were white
male police officers in the Department.5 Plaintiffs brought this action against
the Department and Sheriff Johnson, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,6 to challenge the
constitutionality of the Department's promotion policy under the Reeves
Decree.7 The Department's promotion policy was created after a prior
accusation of racial discrimination! Plaintiffs alleged that the Reeves Decree
should be declared unconstitutional because it "apportions the Department's
annual promotions on the basis of race, excluding them from competing for
one-half of the promotions conferred annually and precipitating the promotion
of less-qualified black applicants." 9 Plaintiffs named seven black officers who
were promoted, and alleged that as Caucasians they could not be considered
for those promotions because they were not black.'0 Specifically, Thigpen, a
captain, challenged the promotions of three black officers to the rank of major,
and Allen, a senior lieutenant, challenged the promotions of four black officers
to the rank of captain." The district court granted defendants' motion for
summary judgment and denied plaintiffs' motion for partial summary
1. Thigpen v. Bibb County Georgia, 223 F.3d 1214 (1 lth Cir. 2000).
2. Thigpen, 223 F.3d at 1235.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 1234.
6. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000).
7. Thigpen, 223 F.3d at 1234.
8. Id.
9. id.
10. Id. Plaintiff Thigpen alleged the promotions of Robert White in 1990, Leonard Thomas in 1992,
and Charles Gantt in 1996 to the rank of major were all conferred based on those employees' races. In
addition, Plaintiff Allen claimed that the promotions of James Reeves in 1986, Robert White in 1989,
Leonard Thomas in 1990, and Stella Davis in 1992 to the rank of captain were also conferred based on the
employees' races.
11. Id.
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judgment on liability. 12 On appeal, the Plaintiffs presented four legal issues:
(1) whether an equal protection claim based on the promotion of black
employees is permitted; (2) whether an equal protection claim brought under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 must be pleaded with a companion claim brought under the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII); (3) whether employment discrimination
claims and equal protection claims may employ the same burden-shifting
analysis; and (4) whether the denial of promotions constitutes a single
continuing violation under the statute of limitations.
13
HOLDING
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit reversed the grant of defendants' motion
for summary judgment and remanded the case because plaintiffs' equal
protection claim was properly pleaded.1 4 The court held that plaintiffs' claims
were not barred by the their failure to file an accompanying Title VII claim
arising under the Civil Rights Act of 1964."5 The court further held that the
McDonnell Douglas6 analysis was not the appropriate framework to evaluate
the constitutionality of the Reeves Decre;, instead the Croson17 standard was
appropriate. 8 Lastly, the court held that the Reeves Decree created multiple
discrete violations containing individual statute of limitation periods.
ANALYSIS
In reviewing the district court's grant of summary judgment, the Eleventh
Circuit examined the district court's four reasons for granting defendants'
motion for summary judgment.' The Eleventh Circuit reviewed the district
court's decision de novo, in accordance with Kirby v. Seigelman.
2
0
Property and Liberty Interests in Equal Protection Claims
The Eleventh Circuit began its analysis by addressing the district court's
finding that in order to properly plead an equal protection claim, plaintiff
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 1244.
15. Id.
16. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
17. City of Richmond v. JA. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
18. ld. at 1241.
19. Id. at 1236.
20. Kirby v. Siegelnan, 195 F.3d 1285, 1289 (11th Cir. 1999) (stating petitions for summary
judgment are reviewed de novo).
[Vol. 7:217
Thigpen v. Bibb County, Georgia
would have to demonstrate a property or liberty interest." The court found
that the district court had erroneously relied on Wu v. Thomas22 when it
concluded that plaintiffs' equal protection claims were not cognizable because
they had not alleged a property or liberty interest in the promotions that were
denied.2 3 Although Wu stated that "a prospective promotion is not a property
or liberty interest protected by the [F]ourteenth [A]mendment," the Eleventh
Circuit pointed out that the quoted language was addressing only the plaintiff' s
due process claim and so the district court took the quote out of context when
it applied it to an equal protection claim.24 The Eleventh Circuit instead
concluded that plaintiffs had properly pleaded an equal protection claim
because the Reeves Decree requires that annual promotions be allocated in
substantial part based on race.2
The Eleventh Circuit then looked at the text of the Fourteenth Amendment
and again concluded that the district court's belief that a property or liberty
interest should be required in an equal protection claim was improper.2 " The
court noted that the Fourteenth Amendment is made up of three clauses, and
only the due process clause addresses property and liberty interests.27 The
court cited City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center2 and Plyler v. Doe2 9
to support its conclusion that plaintiffs pleading an equal protection claim
"need only allege that through state action, similarly situated persons have
been treated disparately.- 30 Because the plaintiffs' complaint was based on the
allegation that similarly situated officers of equal rank were treated differently
as a result of the Reeves Decree's promotion policy based on race, the court
concluded that plaintiffs had asserted proper equal protection claims.
3'
The Connection Between Section 1983 Equal Protection Claims and Title
VII Employment Discrimination Claims
The Eleventh Circuit then evaluated the district court's holding that
plaintiffs' § 1983 claims were procedurally barred because they had not
21. Thigpen, 222 F.3d at 1236.
22. Wu v. Thomas, 847 F.2d 1480, 1485 (11 th Cir. 1988) (deciding that "a prospective promotion
is not a property or liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment").
23. Thigpen, 223 F.3d at 1236. See Wu v. Thomas.
24. Id. at 1236. See Wu v. Thomas, 847 F.2d at 1485 (11 th Cir. 1988).
25. Id.
26. Id. at 1237.
27. Id.
28. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
29. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
30. Thigpen, 223 F.3d at 1237.
31. Id.
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pleaded a companion Title VII claim.32 The Court noted that this was an issue
of first impression in the Circuit, and thus began its analysis by looking at the
historical relationship between § 1983 equal protection claims and Title VII
employment discrimination claims. 33 In holding that, "a section 1983 claim
predicated on the violation of a right guaranteed by the Constitution... can be
pleaded exclusive of a Title VII claim," the Eleventh Circuit found the case
law cited by the district court to be inapplicable and instead based its decision
on a Second Circuit case that directly dealt with the issue.34 In Annis v. County
of Westchester,35 the Second Circuit examined whether a § 1983 equal
protection claim must be accompanied by a Title VII claim. 36 The Second
Circuit found that, "Title VII and § 1983 are equally cognizable causes of
action available to remedy public sector employment discrimination, [and]
reasoned that because section 1983 claims are not preempted by Title VII, they
need not be accompanied by Title VII claims. 37
The Eleventh Circuit agreed with the Second Circuit's disposition of the
issue and held that a § 1983 claim based on the violation of a constitutionally
protected right can be pleaded independently of a Title VII claim.38 Therefore,
the Court found that plaintiffs' § 1983 claims were not procedurally barred by
plaintiffs' failure to plead a Title VII claim.
39
The Proper Analytic Framework for Evaluating Plaintiffs' Equal
Protection Claims
The Eleventh Circuit found that the district court's application of the
analytic framework outlined in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green'0 was
inappropriately applied to plaintiffs' claims."' The Eleventh Circuit pointed
out that the district court incorrectly characterized plaintiffs' claims as
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 1239. See Annis v. County of Westchester, 36 F.3d 251 (2d Cir. 1994). The Eleventh
Circuit held in Johnson v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 148 F.3d 1228, 1231 (11 th Cir. 1998), that the Civil
Rights Act of 1991 did not cause Title VII to be the only redress for public sector employment
discrimination that would preempt a § 1983 cause of action. The district court erroneously interpreted the
Johnson decision to require a § 1983 claim to be plead concurrently with a Title VII claim.
35. Annis v. County of Westchester, 36F.3d 251 (2d Cir. 1994).
36. Annis, 36 F.3d at 254-255.
37. 36 F.3d at 254-55.
38. Thigpen, 223 F.3d at 1322.
39. Id.
40. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (stating that in order to present prima
facie case of discrimination plaintiff would only have to demonstrate that he was qualified for the promotion
and that white got it instead. After such showing, burden would shift to employer to put forth non-
invidious reason to explain why white rather than black employee received the promotion).
41. Thigpen, 223 F.3d at 1322.
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employment discrimination claims, instead of an equal protection claim, and
therefore improperly applied the McDonnell Douglas standard.42 Based on its
previous determination that the Reeves Decree, "establishe[d] certain
mandatory racial quotas for hiring and promotion within the Bibb County
Sheriffs Department,"43 the Eleventh Circuit therefore found it to be an
affirmative action plan." The court evaluated the constitutionality of the
Reeves Decree under the framework set out in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson
Co. 5 because that standard is the proper standard under which an affirmative
action plan is judged.4
In Croson, the Supreme Court evaluated a plan created by the city of
Richmond that mandated that all prime contractors subcontract a percentage
of their construction contracts to minority-owned businesses.47 The Court
found that this affirmative action plan restricted equal opportunity to compete
based upon race.48 The Croson court stated that for all affected citizens, "their
personal rights to be treated with equal dignity and respect are implicated by
a rigid rule erecting race as the sole criterion in an aspect of public
decisionmaking." '49 Based on the use of this "facial racial" classification plan
the Croson court then analyzed Richmond's plan under the Wygant v. Jackson
Board of Education"0 strict scrutiny standard.5 In accordance with strict
scrutiny, the reviewing court must decide whether the plan serves "a
compelling governmental interest and [is] narrowly tailored to the achievement
of the interest.,
52
To illustrate the use of the Croson standard in affirmative action plans, the
Eleventh Circuit cited In re Birmingham Reverse Discrimination Employment
Litigation53 (Birmingham 11).54 The Birmingham H plan, like the Reeves
Decree, required that a fixed percentage of promotions be awarded to black
applicants." The Eleventh Circuit also quoted Ensley Branch, N.A.A.C.P. v.
Seibels,56 which found that the government's interest in remedying past
discrimination "is widely accepted as compelling. As a result, the true test of
42. 223 F.3d at 1322.
43. Reeves, 754 F.2d at 967.
44. Thigpen, 223 F.3d at 1240.
45. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
46. Thigpen, 223 F.3d at 1240.
47. Croson, 488 U.S. at 477.
48. 488 U.S. at 477.
49. Thigpen, 233 F.3d at 1240, quoting Croson, 488 U.S. at 493).
50. Wygant v, Jackson Bd. Of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
51. Croson, 488 U.S. at 520.
52. Thigpen 223 F.3d at 1240 (quoting Wygant, 476 U.S. at 273-74) (plurality).
53. In re Birmingham Reverse Discrimination Employment Litig., 20 F.3d 1525 (1 lth Cir. 1994).
54. Thigpen, 223 F. 3d at 1240.
55. 223 F.3d at 1240.
56. Ensley Branch, N.A.A.C.P. v. Seibels, 31 F.3d 1548 (11th Cir. 1994).
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an affirmative action program is usually not the nature of the government's
interest, but rather the adequacy of the evidence of discrimination offered to
show that interest."'57 In Birmingham I1, the court enumerated several factors
that can be used to determine "whether race-based promotional relief is
narrowly tailored to accomplish a compelling purpose. 5' The factors include:
the necessity for the relief and the efficacy of alternative remedies, the
flexibility and duration of the relief, including the availability of waiver
provisions, the relationship of numerical goals to the relevant labor market,
and the impact of the relief on the rights of [non-minority officers] .9
The Eleventh Circuit concluded that Croson and Birmingham H provide the
proper framework for evaluating plaintiffs' equal protection claims, not
McDonnell Douglas.' Consequently, the court found that summary
judgment was inappropriate and remanded the case for further proceedings.6
The Eleventh Circuit rejected defendants' three arguments that they should be
entitled to summary judgment because: "(1) the Reeves Decree does not
require the sheriff to award individual promotions based on race; (2) even
absent the Reeves Decree, the promotions would have been awarded to the
same officers; and (3) judicial oversight of the Reeves Decree shields
defendants from liability. '62 In dismissing defendants' first argument the court
found that, "the pattern in which the promotions are conferred is irrelevant,
because the result is the same: fifty percent of the annual promotions must be
awarded to black officers, effectively excluding white officers from
consideration for those promotions. ' '63 The court found that the racial
allocation of promotions required by the Reeves Decree could create
constitutional violations prohibited by Croson.6
Although the court acknowledged that it had permitted the so-called "same
decision" defense in § 1983 equal protection claims, it noted that this defense
was "immaterial to a constitutional challenge to an affirmative action plan that
imposes a racial classification." 5 The court cited Northeastern Florida
Chapter of the Associated General Contractors of America v. City of
Jacksonville,66 in which the Supreme Court found that:
57. Thigpen, 223 F.3d at 1240 (quoting Ensley Branch, N.A.A.C.P. v. Seibels, 31 F.3d at 1565).
58. 223 F.3d at 1240.
59. Birmingham 11, 20 F.3d at 1545.
60. Thigpen, 223 F.3d at 1241.
61. id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 1242.
65. Id.
66. Northeastern Fla. Chapter of the Assoc. Gen. Contractors of Am. v. City of Jacksonville, 508
U.S. 656 (1993).
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When the government erects a barrier that makes it more difficult for
members of one group to obtain a benefit than it is for members of another
group, a member of the former group seeking to challenge the barrier need
not allege that he would have obtained the benefit but for the barrier...The
injury in fact in an equal protection case of this variety is the denial of equal
treatment resulting from the imposition of the barrier, not the ultimate
inability to obtain the benefit.67
The Thigpen court reasoned that the plaintiffs' failure to be promoted
could be the result of not being considered for half of the promotions conferred
by the Department.68 Thus, the Court rejected defendants' "same decision"
defense as irrelevant. 69
The court dismissed the defendants' final argument that judicial oversight
of the Reeves Decree should shield them from liability. The court cited In re
Birmingham Reverse Discrimination Employment Litigation (Birmingham J)70
in which it "reject[ed] any notion that the memorialization of [a] voluntary
undertaking in the form of a consent decree somehow provide[d] the employer
with extra protection against charges of illegal discrimination."'7' The Eleventh
Circuit concluded that the district court's grant of summary judgment was
inappropriate and therefore remanded the issue.
Statute of Limitations and Plaintiffs' Equal Protection Claims
In evaluating the district court's treatment of the statute of limitations for
plaintiffs' equal protection claims the Eleventh Circuit first determined that the
statute of limitations for a § 1983 claim in Georgia is two years.72 Because this
suit was filed in 1996, the district court held that all promotions that occurred
between 1986 and 1992 were precluded from review.73 Plaintiffs, however,
contended that because the Reeves Decree had governed all promotions, it
"constitute[d] a single continuing violation" under the equal protection clause.
To determine the meaning of a "continuing violation" the court looked at its
prior decision in Calloway v. Partners National Health Plans,74 where it
"distinguished between the present consequence of a one time violation, which
67. Northeastern Fla. Chapter of the Assoc. Gen. Contractors of Am., 508 U.S. at 666.
68. Thigpen, 223 F.3d at 1243.
69. 223 F3d at 1243.
70. In re Birmingham Reverse Discrimination Employment Litig., 833 F.2d 1492 (11 th Cir. 1987).
71. Thigpen, 223 F.3d at 1243 (quoting Birmingham, 833 F.2d at 501).
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Calloway v. Partners Nat'l Health Plans, 986 F.2d 446, 448 (11 th Cir. 1993).
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does not extend the limitations period, and the continuation of that violation
into the present, which does."
75
The Court rejected Plaintiffs' reliance on Beavers v. American Cast Iron
Pipe Company76 as distinguishable, and instead found Knight v. Columbus
Georgia' to be more applicable to plaintiffs' case.78 In Knight,9 the city
allegedly misclassified the status of the plaintiffs, thereby failing to properly
pay the plaintiffs for overtime." The court in Knight viewed the failure to pay
overtime as a series of repeated violations and not "one on-going violation."'"
The Eleventh Circuit, relying on Knight, found that "although the Reeves
Decree, like the classification scheme at issue in Knight, is a constant, it gives
rise to discrete violations, each triggering its own statute of limitations
period."82 Therefore, the court found that plaintiffs could only rely on the
promotion of Charles Gant to establish their constitutional challenge of the
Reeves Decree, because only Gant's promotion in 1994 was within the two-
year statute of limitations.8 3
Plaintiffs' Cross-Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
The Eleventh Circuit lastly examined plaintiffs' appeal of the district
court's denial of their cross-motion for partial summary judgment on the issue
of liability. 4 The court found that the district court's grant of summary
judgment to defendants naturally led to the denial of plaintiffs' corresponding
cross-motion. Though it reversed the district court's grant of defendants'
motion, the appellate court affirmed its denial of plaintiffs' cross-motion. 5
The court explained, "the operation of the Reeves Decree does not necessarily
offend the equal protection clause."8 6 The court concluded that the issue of
75. Thigpen, 223 F.3d at 1243.
76. Beavers v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 975 F.2d 792 (holding that where employer's benefits
policy only applied to children who lived full-time with their employee-parent, claim was timely despite
being outside statute of limitations because injury resulted on-going policy).
77. Calloway v. Partners Nat'I Health Plans, 986 F.2d 446 (11th Cir. 1993).
78. Knight v. Columbus Georgia, 19 F.3d 579 (11 th Cir. 1994).
79. Thigpen, 223 F.3d at 1243.
80. 223 F.3dat 1243.
81. Knight, 19 F.3d at 582.
82. Thigpen, 223 F.3d at 1243.
83. Id. Because the suit was filed in August of 1996, the statute of limitations dates back two years
from that date, i.e., August of 1994. Within this time period only the promotion of Charles Gantt applies.
All other promotions were conferred by Sheriff Wilkes between 1986 and 1992 and are therefore not
cognizable.
84. Thigpen, 223 F.3d at 1244.
85. Id.
86. Id.
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liability was not appropriate until the constitutionality of the Reeves Decree
could be determined on remand.87
CONCLUSION
Upon remand the district court will have to evaluate plaintiffs' claim under
Croson. Using the strict scrutiny standard, the district court will likely
invalidate the Reeves Decree because it is not narrowly tailored to remedy past
discrimination.
The effect of this decision could have significant implications. The debate
over affirmative action plans usually focuses on their use in higher education
admissions. However, Thigpen points out that the effects of affirmative action
are far reaching. Affirmative action plans, though a source of debate, serve
important governmental interests of curbing the effects of past discrimination.
Unfortunately, ill-devised plans that merely choose an arbitrary number to
remedy past discrimination miss the point. If plans could be devised that
would be narrowly tailored, much of the confusion that surrounds the issue
could be allayed.
Thigpen highlights the importance of understanding the nature of a claim
in order to employ the necessary analytic framework. Much of the confusion
in Thigpen surfaced because the district court viewed the dispute as several
individual alleged occurrences of employment discrimination instead of a
dispute concerning the constitutionality of the Reeves decree. Owing to this
confusion the district court applied the McDonnell Douglas standard typically
associated with employment discrimination. Instead the proper standard was
Croson, which is employed in the cases of affirmative action plans and hence
invokes Equal Protection concerns.
Summary and Analysis Prepared by:
Brian Richardson
87. Id.
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